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Almost 172 million people live in complex emergencies globally resulting from 
political and/or economic instability. The provision and continuity of health care in 
complex emergencies remain a significant challenge. Health agencies are often 
hesitant to implement tuberculosis programmes in particular because its treatment 
requires a longer commitment than most acute diseases. However, not treating 
tuberculosis promptly increases mortality and untreated tuberculosis further increases 
the incidence of tuberculosis. Given that complex emergencies are increasing 
globally, there is an urgent need to analyse the available evidence to improve our 
understanding of how best to deliver tuberculosis programmes in such settings. Using 
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a scoping review method, we selected and analysed fifteen studies on tuberculosis 
programmes in complex emergencies. We found that despite the challenges, 
tuberculosis programmes have been successful in complex emergencies. We 
identified seven cross-cutting factors that were found to be important: service 
providers and treatment regime, training and supervision, donor support, adherence, 
leadership and coordination, monitoring, and government and community support. In 
general, programmes showed greater creativity and flexibility to adapt to the local 
conditions and at times, it also meant diverting from the WHO guidelines. We 
identify areas of further research including the need to study the effectiveness of 
programmes that divert from the WHO guidelines and their implication on drug 
resistance.                                                                                   
 





The number of armed conflicts has been increasing globally since 2013 (Dupuy et al. 
2017). Although colonial and interstate conflicts have reduced, conflicts internal to 
countries have increased, but these internal conflicts often have external state actors. 
These conflicts can be categorised as complex emergencies, defined by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) as “situations of disrupted livelihood and threats to life 
produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, in which 
any emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and security 
environment” (Wisner and Adams 2002). Complex emergencies do not have 
straightforward transmission between phases, they are characterised by continued 
political instability, economic instability and chronic conflict that can disrupt 
countries for long periods of time. There is also a 50% risk of post conflict societies 
reverting to conflict within the first five years (Collier et al. 2003). Low- and middle-
income countries (LMIC) bear the largest burden of complex emergencies. Of the 172 
million people affected by complex emergencies globally, the majority live in LMIC 
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 2013).  
 
The impact of complex emergencies on population health can be devastating. Besides 
the increased deaths as a direct result of the emergency, there is also an increase in the 
incidence of diseases. Connolly et al. (2004) estimate that the highest excess 
morbidity and mortality often occurs during the acute phase of the emergency, and 
communicable diseases, alone or in combination with malnutrition, account for most 
of these deaths.  Of particular concern is the rise in incidence and mortality from 
tuberculosis. As seen in several war-struck countries: In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
incidence of newly diagnosed tuberculosis rose to four times the pre-war levels (Toole 
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et al. 1993), in Guinea-Bissau tuberculosis was associated with a three-fold increase 
in mortality during the first six months of the war (Gustafson et al. 2001). Congo-
Brazzaville experienced a period of war from 1997 to 1999; the annual number of 
new tuberculosis cases increased from 1,691 in 1994 to 4,218 in 2000 (M'Boussa et 
al. 2002).     
 
Kimbrough et al. (2012) state that while incidence and mortality from tuberculosis 
tend to increase during times of complex emergencies, treatment rates decrease with 
increasing intensity of the emergency. This may be because of disruptions to health 
services (Biot et al. 2003, M'Boussa et al. 2002) and being an airborne disease, 
untreated tuberculosis, in turn, increases the transmission rate. Moreover, there is a 
risk of further spread of infection due to overcrowding, acute malnutrition and poor 
living conditions (Cegielski and McMurray 2004, Toole et al. 1993).  
 
The treatment of tuberculosis is complex. Tuberculosis affects the lungs in 85% of the 
cases and 57% of these cases are sputum smear-positive and therefore highly 
infectious (World Health Organization 2016). The standard regimen for pulmonary 
tuberculosis, recommended by the WHO, includes a six-month course of antibiotics 
using directly observed treatment (DOTS) strategy, which involves patients 
swallowing the medication whilst being directly observed by a health staff, supervised 
and supported treatment, control the rise of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-
TB) that emerges due to the inappropriate or incorrect use of drugs, or interruption of 




In complex emergencies, detection and treatment of TB become even more 
challenging. Unlike other communicable diseases such as measles, mumps and 
pneumonia, symptoms of TB are not easily visible. Governments and NGOs are also 
hesitant to address TB as the treatment requires a longer commitment than most acute 
diseases and the risk of interruption of treatment due to the conflict can lead to 
increased resistance to TB medications. In these circumstances, they are unsure 
whether they can comply with the treatment targets set by the WHO - TB programmes 
should focus on sputum-positive pulmonary TB patients and they should aim to 
achieve 85% cure rate with DOTS in six months (Biot et al. 2003). As these high 
levels of cure rates and the provision of undisrupted treatment are not guaranteed, in 
many complex emergencies, TB programmes are often postponed until stability is 
secured. The consequence is delayed, disrupted treatment for a large and highly 
vulnerable and infectious group of patients.  
 
To reduce the human, social and economic costs of TB, for the first time, the WHO 
drafted recommendations for TB control specific to emergencies (Kimbrough et al. 
2012). However, despite these recommendations, evidence on what works is unclear 
and fragmented. The aim of this paper is to conduct a scoping review of available 
evidence and identify factors that contribute to successful implementation of TB 
programmes in complex emergencies. We specifically focus on LMIC as these 
countries not only bear the global burden of complex emergencies, they also bear the 
global burden of TB: 95% of TB cases and 98% of TB deaths occur in LMIC (World 




Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Studies published between January 1995 and September 2015 that examined the 
implementation of TB programmes in complex emergencies in LMIC were included 
in the review. We included all types of studies, including reviews, commentaries and 
policy reports. Conference proceedings and abstracts were included only if full texts 
were available. Studies on refugee camps, which have a different set-up as compared 
to complex emergencies, were excluded. We also excluded studies where TB was 
discussed as a secondary illness to HIV and studies that focused entirely on MDR-TB. 
Search Strategy 
A comprehensive strategy was implemented to identify relevant literature. We first 
conducted the search using several online databases: Embase, Global Health, 
MedLine with the Ovid search engine, and CINAHL Plus and Health Policy 
Reference Center using the EBSCOhost search engine. A MeSH thesaurus and the 
Cochrane Database for reviews were consulted to identify key words to search these 
databases. The search string included a combination of these words: [“tuberculosis” or 
“TB”] and [“continuation of care” or “treatment continuation” or “treatment 
programme” or “directly observed treatment” or “deliver* of treatment”] and 
[“complex emergency” or “crisis” or “war” or “conflict” or “armed conflict” or 
“fragile state” or “unstable” or “chronic complex emergency” or “conflict-affected” or 
“fragile” or “insecurity” or “violence”, or “humanitarian crisis”]. We further used 
country limiters to capture studies on LMIC only. Secondly, to identify grey 
literature, we searched OpenGrey and the websites of key organisations that have 
7 
 
technical expertise in delivering health programmes in complex emergencies (WHO 
and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)).  
 
Using the recommendations of the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) (Moher et al. 2009), all retrieved studies were initially 
screened using the title and abstract. After removing those that did not meet the 
inclusion criteria, full texts of the remaining studies were reviewed and only those that 
met the inclusion criteria were selected. Finally, we screened the bibliographies of all 
selected studies. A study was selected only if both the authors agreed it was relevant 
for the review.  
 
We did not follow the methodology like the one suggested by the Cochrane Effective 
Practice and Organisation of Care Review Group (EPOC) because we were interested 
in the process and operationalisation of tuberculosis programmes in complex 
emergencies that have been studied using non-experimental study designs using both 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods (Ridde and Morestin 2011) . EPOC 
approach is normally applied for synthesizing evidence on effectiveness. Instead, we 
used the scoping review method, which is recommended for studying the process of 
implementing complex interventions and it does not discriminate among studies based 
on methodological criteria (Arksey and O'Malley 2005)   
 
Data extraction and synthesis 
Our data extraction and analysis consisted of two parts. First, we extracted data on the 
study context, methodology, treatment, service delivery, and main organisations 
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involved in the programme. We used the WHO target to assess treatment success i.e. 
85% cure rate for DOTS (Biot et al. 2003). Given that complex emergencies can 
differ in terms of severity, using Macias (2013) typology, we categorised the 
emergency for each included study as acute (active high-level armed conflict), 
chronic (persistent low-level armed conflict) or protracted (high-level armed conflict 
with diffused violence and persistent instability involving neighbouring states).  
Second, we analysed the full text of the included studies to identify factors that 
contributed to the success of TB programmes. In accordance with the scoping review 
method, we did not distinguish between studies in terms of the soundness of their 
design nor did we assign weights dependent on their data (Arksey and O'Malley 
2005). However, we have summarised the studies in the results section that provide an 
indication of the robustness of the designs used.      
Results 
 
Description of studies 
Fifteen studies met our inclusion criteria and were included in the review: ten 
quantitative, two qualitative and three mixed-methods studies (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 
 
Of the fifteen studies, covering twelve countries, the majority were from Africa (n=6) 
and Asia (n=6), one each from South America and Europe, and one used data from 
multiple countries. Together, they included six acute, five chronic, and four protracted 





The majority of the quantitative studies used a longitudinal design (n=7), where they 
followed patients on TB treatment (Salomao 1991, Keus et al. 2003, Agutu 1997, 
Doveren 2001, Rodger et al. 2002, Norval et al. 1998). Only Das et al. (2014) include 
two different approaches of delivering TB treatment in India – DOTS and SAT (self-
administered treatment). Five studies used routinely collected patient and 
administrative data (Ahmadzai et al. 2008, Martins et al. 2006, Heldal et al. 1997, 
Tigani et al. 2008, Mauch et al. 2010). Among the qualitative and mixed methods 
studies, three studies were written in a case-study format (Seddiq et al. 2014, Tigani et 
al. 2008, Mauch et al. 2010) and two included interviews with staff and key 
informants (Liddle et al. 2013, Seddiq et al. 2014)..  
 
Applying the WHO target of 85% cure rate, only four countries did not meet this 
target, but three of them achieved 81% cure rate in some years/regions (Figure 2). In 
Nicaragua, the cure rate of 81% was achieved in the conflict zones in 1988 (Heldal et 
al. 1997) but it dropped the next two years to 63%. However, it is important to note 
that the higher rate of 81% was the highest cure rate in the country, even 
outperforming the regions unaffected by the conflict. In East Timor, the cure rate 
improved from 50% in 1997 to 81% in 2003 (Martins et al. 2006), similar to the rate 
reported in Haiti (Mauch et al. 2010). In contrast, in Mozambique, the cure rate did 
not improve in the five years covered by the study (1985-1989) and remained close to 





In Somalia, Agutu et al. (1997) using data from 1998, reported a cure rate of 74% in 
the Luuq. Although Mauch et al. (2010) and Liddle et al. (2013), studying later 
periods, reported higher rates, 89% (2000-2005) and 81% (2005-2012): the former 
figure is the average national rate for the NTP while the latter is an MSF-run 
programme operating in only two regions.  
 
In India, Das et al. (2014) found that the DOTS regimen performed better than the 
shortened SAT, 70% vs 53%, although both performed below the WHO threshold. 
However, the authors still concluded that these programmes were successful. In 
contrast, a previous study from India (Rodger et al. 2002), different region and time 
period, did meet the WHO threshold and achieved 86% cure rate with a DOTS-based 
programme. 
 
Five countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Kosovo, and South Sudan) 
consistently reported a successful cure rate. From these, Kosovo reported the highest 
cure rate of 93% which increased from 87% in 2001. Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) reported 85% cure rate in 2005, slightly higher than 84% reported the previous 
year. In Afghanistan, cure rate increased from 87% in 2004 to 91% in 2011. The study 
by Seddiq et al. (2014) on Afghanistan, covered the period from 2006 to 2011 but did 
not specify the type of TB and therefore, could not be compared to the WHO 
threshold.  
 
Factors contributing to the success of TB programmes 
We identified seven factors that determined the success of TB programmes in 
complex emergencies.  
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1. Service providers and treatment format 
Service provision and treatment regimens for complex emergencies were not 
standardised across settings. Service provision reflected the availability of providers 
and the WHO recommended treatment regimen was adapted based on what was 
feasible and practical. Modifying the treatment regime and using established service 
providers were identified as factors of successful TB control programmes.  
 
In South Sudan, the treatment was reduced to four months of daily supervision, 
instead of WHO recommended six months of DOTS which was found to be 
unfeasible for a semi-nomadic population (Keus et al. 2003). Further, contingency 
plans were made and in the event of evacuations of staff and local populations, 
patients were given “runaway-bags” with a one-month supply of drugs. They were 
also informed to meet in four weeks at a pre-arranged location to replenish their drug 
supply if the situation does not improve.  
 
In India, the health workers adopted two different strategies depending on the security 
situation (Das et al. 2014). When feasible, the standardised DOTS programme was 
used, otherwise, treatment was delivered through MSF mobile clinics using the Self-
administered Tuberculosis Treatment (SAT) strategy. Under SAT, patients were given 
two months medications and advised to return to a fixed place after six weeks, where 
the mobile clinic would be with more medication. In another study in Churachandpur, 
India, the DOTS programme required the staff to meet the patient only three times per 
week, instead of daily, as it was difficult and dangerous to travel (Rodger et al. 2002). 




In Nicaragua, TB treatment was for eight months: two-month intensive treatment, 
administered in the DOTS format and for the remaining six months, patients were 
required to attend the health facility only weekly, twice monthly or monthly to receive 
the supply of TB medications (Heldal et al. 1997).  
 
The service provider, as a key factor for success, were emphasised in Cambodia and 
India. In Cambodia, TB wards were integrated into the general public hospitals, 
reducing significant delays in starting the treatment (Norval et al. 1998). In India, 
using an established and trusted clinic gave credibility to the programme (Rodger et 
al. 2002).  
2. Training and supervision  
All studies underlined the importance of continuous learning and training 
opportunities for staff. Training and supervision also helped build strong relationships 
between team members, who work under stressful circumstances, and created a 
unified approach to problem-solving.  
 
In Mozambique, training through annual national seminars, strengthened programme 
supervision (Salomao 1991). In East Timor, staff attended a three-month training 
workshop (Martins et al. 2006). In Nicaragua, the personal responsible for managing 
the programme attended regional training before the introduction of the short-course 
treatment. In addition, doctors and nurses attended annual seminars to refresh 
practical skills and discuss common problems. This also helped develop problem-
solving skills and team-building (Heldal et al. 1997). In Churachandpur, India, 
outreach workers, TB coordinator and lab technician attended a formal training 
programme which also facilitated team-building and respect (Rodger et al. 2002). In 
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South Sudan, educating all staff rather than focusing on only those in the TB 
programme, improved case findings by reducing delays in diagnosis (Keus et al. 
2003).  
 
In Afghanistan, DOTS training was extended to community health workers (CHWs). 
Besides bridging the gap between the community and health facilities, engaging 
CHWs in delivering the TB programme also enabled the development of a stronger 
relationship between the community and the programme and made the programme 
more responsive. Furthermore, the programme put emphasis on recruiting women 
CHWs as it also improved access to women’s health issues (Ahmadzai et al. 2008, 
Seddiq et al. 2014). Although not measured, it was hoped that using women CHWs 
would minimise gender disparities within TB diagnosis and treatment. 
 
In Angola, the staff training was more comprehensive. Besides training in DOTS 
administration, they also received training on educating patients and defaulter tracing 
techniques. Furthermore, the lab personnel received training in staining techniques, 
sunlight microscopy and waste disposal. Three training sessions of one week were 
conducted in a new province every month (Doveren 2001). Staff willingness to 
engage and learn made a big difference to the programme performance. As found in 
other studies, this also helped team-building and developed problem-solving skills.   
 
The Cambodian Programme emphasised continuous training rather than one-off 
training for staff. Refresher training was regularly held for all levels of staff that also 
helped to maintain staff interest. For provincial staff at the central level, workshops 
using a shortened version of the WHO module, quarterly seminars and annual 
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conferences were organised. In addition, payment of per diem on supervision and 
training visits greatly enhanced the motivation of staff (Norval et al. 1998).  
 
The Kosovo study emphasised the importance of human resources development 
within the international framework (Tigani et al. 2008). For example, individualised 
training was performed throughout the programme by international consultants. 
Senior staff took part in many regional workshops and international conferences and 
courses, which also improved staff motivation. Likewise, in Somalia, international 
staff played an important role in training and supervision (Liddle et al. 2013). 
Initially, the international staff were based in Somalia but due to safety concerns were 
later evaluated. They, however, continued to provide support from a neighbouring 
country, Kenya, and there was no effect on treatment rates (adjusted OR 0.85, 
p=0.27).  
 
In addition, continuous support and supervision of staff were also identified as key 
factors in Nicaragua, Somalia, Mozambique and Kosovo. In Somalia (Liddle et al. 
2013) and Mozambique (Salomao 1991) this was done either by regular visits or daily 
communication by the remote management team. In Kosovo, the core team of 
international consultants were engaged throughout the five-year period, offering 
assistance in planning, implementation and technical support (Tigani et al. 2008). 
3. Donor support  
Countries suffering from complex emergencies are fragile states with a weakened 
government lacking in financial and human resources. In such settings, several studies 




In many countries, donor support for supplies, funds and drugs contributed to the 
success of the TB programmes. In Somalia, donors provided communication 
equipment which helped both the field staff and the remote team to communicate and 
coordinate their activities, as well as made staff, feel supported (Liddle et al. 2013). 
Further, continuous supply of anti-TB drugs from international suppliers was also 
critical to avoid disruption to treatment (Agutu 1997). International support for TB 
drugs was also crucial in South Sudan, East Timor and India (Keus et al. 2003, 
Martins et al. 2006, Rodger et al. 2002). In India, drugs were stored on site in secure 
facilities for the 12-month period and treatment was free (Rodger et al. 2002).  
 
In Cambodia, support was provided by several international organisations. The initial 
supply of drugs was donated by non-governmental organisations. French funds, 
through WHO, covered the costs of training and supervision, and later the World 
Bank gave a five-year loan of $8 million that guaranteed the continuous availability of 
anti-TB drugs (Norval et al. 1998). In East Timor, external donor funds were seen as a 
key component in accelerating the process of developing and not for the continuous 
supply of drug they provided (Martins et al. 2006).  
 
In Afghanistan, besides provision of funds, international support in technical 
assistance was also important. The WHO provided technical assistance in proposal 
writing and fulfilling grant implementation requirements, helping the programme to 
secure larger funds (Seddiq et al. 2014). In Kosovo, the NTP, in collaboration with 
DOW-US, acquired a grant from the GDF, which provided for free TB drugs for three 




Many programmes devised methods of promoting treatment adherence. These 
methods can be divided into five types: distance to treatment, incentives, building 
strong relationships, educating patients, and record keeping.  
 
Reducing the distance travelled by patients to reach clinics encouraged compliance. In 
Somalia, the programme ensured patients coming from distant locations stayed near 
the project in “TB Villages” throughout the treatment course (Liddle et al. 2013). This 
MSF-run programme also provided accommodation for relatives. In addition, “DOTS 
corners” were set up in towns, which provided treatment near the patient’s place of 
residence. Similar strategies were used in South Sudan, Nicaragua and DRC (Keus et 
al. 2003, Heldal et al. 1997, Ndongosieme et al. 2007) where severely ill patients were 
offered accommodation in tents within the treatment centres or were hospitalised if 
they lived too far away. Likewise, in Angola and East Timor, patients who were 
unable to walk long distances or who lived too far away, were offered temporary 
housing for a limited period near the outpatient clinic (Doveren 2001, Martins et al. 
2006).  
 
In Churachandpur, India, instead of bringing the patients closer to the treatment, the 
treatment was brought closer to the patients. Outreach workers providing the DOTS 
treatment lived in the same area as their patients (Rodger et al. 2002). Each round trip 
was less than six kilometres. This not only had an effect on adherence; if a patient was 
absent at the specified time, the outreach worker could return later that day to 
administer the medication as the distance travelled was not far, but it also reduced 
hazards and the probability of encountering an unsafe situation. Only for clinical 
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reviews at the larger clinic, patients had to travel but the distance was less than five 
kilometres. Reducing patient travel had an added benefit of reducing possible TB 
transmission. However, Rodger et al. (2002) study had a small cohort of 178 patients, 
all living in the same region. This method may not be feasible for larger groups of 
patients, dispersed over larger areas.   
 
Strong relationships between health workers and patients contributed to improving 
compliance. This is particularly important in conflict regions where suspicion and 
mistrust are common and most programmes incorporated special arrangements to 
strengthen this aspect. In the MSF-run programme in South Sudan, patients were 
divided into three distinctive groups, supervised by a specific MSF-trained health 
worker who understood the personal needs and situation of the patients (Keus et al. 
2003). In addition, medical staff spent extra time with patients and showed interest in 
their daily life and regularly inquired about any treatment side effects affecting their 
lifestyle. This helped develop a strong doctor-patient relationship. In Churachandpur, 
India, part-time local community outreach workers were employed for each ethnic 
group, extending access to all affected communities. Community elders acted as 
advisors to the outreach workers, which helped the workers to understand and take 
account of ethnic sensitivities (Rodger et al. 2002). In East Timor, community-based 
treatment observers, known as “motivators” were engaged in the programme to 
promote adherence (Martins et al. 2006). During the conflict in Kosovo (Tigani et al. 
2008) health workers were carefully selected: who can safely cooperate with both 
dominant and minority populations. In the TB programme a “Minorities Coordinator” 




Incentives were effective in improving adherence in seven countries. This is contrary 
to the WHO field manual for TB treatment in refugee populations which states that 
incentives are not routinely necessary for successful TB treatment (Connolly et al. 
2007). Given the food supply insecurity in complex emergencies, food rations were 
successful. In Somalia, besides patients, their guarantors, who signed a written 
agreement stating the patient must complete the full course of the treatment, were also 
given a dry food ration as an incentive to support the patient (Liddle et al. 2013). 
Similarly, treatment guarantors were also given rations in South Sudan. In India, 
distributing eggs to patients on a weekly basis was an incentive for patients to remain 
in the area (Rodger et al. 2002). In Cambodia and Afghanistan, food support was 
provided in collaboration with the World Food Programme (Norval et al. 1998, 
Seddiq et al. 2014). In East Timor, besides supplementary food, the programme also 
covered transport costs for some patients (Martins et al. 2006). Only in Angola 
patients were given non-ration incentives (Doveren 2001). They were awarded a 
certificate on completing the initial phase. The patients valued this certificate greatly 
as this meant they were no longer excluded from work.  
 
Educating patients on TB treatment and transmission was another method to promote 
adherence, however, this is not unique to complex emergencies. In Somalia, education 
activities with patients were carried out regularly in the DOTS centres (Liddle et al. 
2013) and the patients have explained the importance of completing their anti-TB 
medication in the outpatient clinics (Agutu 1997). In South Sudan, before starting the 
treatment every patient was counselled to avoid defaulting (Keus et al. 2003). The 
programme approach to overcoming certain traditions in the Nuer culture was to 
counsel female patients along with their husbands, as the man traditionally makes 
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family decisions. By having the husband present during these sessions, he too 
understood the importance of adherence. In Churachandpur, India, patients were not 
only counselled on the need to comply but signed a declaration stating they will 
complete the full treatment (Rodger et al. 2002). In Angola, weekly education 
sessions for the patients waiting in the outpatient clinic were given both in Portuguese 
and the local dialect. Further, time was allocated for medical consultation and patient 
counselling daily (Doveren 2001). In India, default patients were given additional 
supportive counselling (Das et al. 2014). 
 
Keeping up-to-date patient records, including their contact details, in the clinics 
helped the staff to follow-up. In Somalia, mobile numbers were taken from patients in 
case they needed to be contacted (Liddle et al. 2013). In South Sudan, health workers 
were able to trace their patients the same day they defaulted (Keus et al. 2003). In 
India, the project also maintained records of other people who could be contacted if 
the patient did not attend an appointment (Rodger et al. 2002).  
5. Leadership and coordination  
Strong, stable and flexible management, was found to be important in seven countries. 
In Afghanistan, visible leadership taken by one agency was crucial in avoiding 
confusion, diffused implementation and duplication of efforts (Seddiq et al. 2014). 
Effective coordination among stakeholders was achieved through regular meetings 
and e-sharing. The programme further engaged patients, their families and 
communities through social mobilisation activities, for example by involving religious 
scholars and priests. No other study created partnerships at the community level as 
part of their coordination strategy. In Nicaragua, a manager was appointed for each 
area, who coordinated with the laboratory and patients, oversaw adherence and 
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ordered supplies (Heldal et al. 1997). Strong and stable partnerships and coordination 
were also identified as important in Afghanistan, DRC, Haiti and Somalia, which was 
achieved by using a common framework for TB control with the DOTS programme 
(Mauch et al. 2010). In the DRC, effective coordination between non-government 
organisations and the Ministry of Health was achieved by creating a memorandum of 
understanding signed by all parties involved. This memorandum described the rights 
and responsibilities of each partner, ensuring all partners understood their role 
(Ndongosieme et al. 2007). In East Timor, duplication of efforts was avoided by 
clearly discussing individual responsibilities of each agency involved in the 
implementation of the TB programme and coordination was improved by holding 
weekly meetings (Martins et al. 2006). In Kosovo, an authoritative agency was 
identified to provide oversight and keep track of goals and objectives (Tigani et al. 
2008). For example, the WHO assumed responsibility, in the absence of a Ministry of 
Health, for TB control and considered various organisations on the ground to identify 
as lead partner. As mentioned in other countries, this approach helped avoid 
duplicating efforts.  
6. Monitoring 
Effective monitoring was identified as an essential factor for implementing TB 
programmes in most countries. Countries used different mechanisms of monitoring 
but all programmes emphasised the importance of data and communication. In 
Somalia, patient data and pharmacy consumption data was reviewed weekly to avoid 
stock outs (Liddle et al. 2013). Random checking of the TB registration book and of 
patient medical records was conducted. Weekly monitoring calls were held with 
international staff based in Nairobi and when safe, the international staff came to meet 
the in-country team and visit field sites. In India, up-to-date patient records, including 
21 
 
treatment and laboratory data, were maintained and reviewed regularly (Das et al. 
2014). In Churachandpur, India, recording and reporting systems, recommended by 
the WHO plus RNTCP, were found to be useful in monitoring (Rodger et al. 2002). 
The programme also created project-specific forms used for recording clinical and 
sociodemographic information of patients. In Nicaragua and Kosovo, quarterly 
supervisory visits were conducted to review records, verify reporting and discuss 
operational problems (Heldal et al. 1997, Tigani et al. 2008). These visits were 
continued in Nicaragua even when the region was unsafe due to the on-going conflict.  
 
Programmes in Afghanistan, East Timor, Cambodia, and Mozambique established 
national monitoring systems. The Afghanistan NTP introduced uniform training 
systems and quality assurance guidelines, and monthly service reports were submitted 
by more than 90% of the health care facilities (Ahmadzai et al. 2008, Seddiq et al. 
2014). In East Timor, the Caritas Tuberculosis Programme (CTP) and the NTP 
conducted regular laboratory quality-assurance checks using the WHO standard 
methods (Martins et al. 2006). In Cambodia, quarterly reports and cohort analysis 
were done for each TB unit and these reports were sent to the CENAT and the 
Ministry of Health for monitoring (Norval et al. 1998). In Mozambique, besides 
regular monitoring, the central staff participated in yearly national seminars where 
case-findings, treatment and quality control system were discussed across regions 
(Salomao 1991).   
7. Government and community support  
TB programmes in conflict regions required political sanction from community 
leaders and government. Strong endorsements from the government provided high-
level of authority and credibility to the programme team (Norval et al. 1998). In 
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Somalia and India, acceptance, trust and support from local leaders were essential for 
programme sustainability (Liddle et al. 2013, Rodger et al. 2002). In India, running 
the programme from a trusted and established clinic gave it credibility. Besides 
government and community leaders, the programme in South Sudan also had strong 
political support from army commanders (Keus et al. 2003). In Afghanistan, the 
government declared controlling TB as a national priority, which increased 
commitment from international donors (Seddiq et al. 2014). This was also true for the 
Nicaraguan programme where health authorities acknowledged TB as a serious threat 
and helped reserve hospital beds for TB patients (Heldal et al. 1997). In East Timor, 
the commitment of the local authorities helped vulnerable TB patients - homeless and 
children orphaned by the armed conflict - receive accommodation during their 
treatment (Martins et al. 2006).  
Discussion  
Delivering TB programmes in complex emergencies is challenging. Acute staff 
shortages, disruption of supplies and funds, destruction of health facilities, and 
displacement of people are common problems. However, our review found that in 
spite of these challenges, programmes have been successful in delivering TB 
programmes in several LMIC countries. We identified several factors that have 
contributed to this success, however, importance of these factors to a particular 
programme depended on the nature of the complex emergency and the local context.  
 
Creative solutions were used to promote completion of treatment and reduce 
noncompliance. Contingency plans were set in place in South Sudan which included 
giving ‘runaway bags’ of TB drugs to patients when the crisis deteriorated (Keus et al. 
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2003). In Angola, patients were awarded certificates after completion of the initial 
phase and in Somalia, patients were made to sign a written agreement to complete the 
treatment (Doveren 2001, Liddle et al. 2013). These are straightforward solutions, yet 
produced high adherence rates as the patients greatly valued the certificate and the 
agreement. In Somalia and South Sudan, guarantors were also identified from the 
community who supported and encouraged the patients (Keus et al. 2003, Liddle et al. 
2013).  
 
Our analysis revealed that many TB programmes diverted from the WHO guidelines. 
In South Sudan, Somalia, India and Nicaragua, the WHO recommended six-month 
DOTS programme was modified (Keus et al. 2003, Liddle et al. 2013, Das et al. 2014, 
Heldal et al. 1997). The directly supervised phase was reduced to four months in 
South Sudan and to two months in Somalia and Nicaragua, while the remaining 
treatment was self-administered by the patients. In the SAT programme in India, 
treatment was unsupervised throughout – patients were given a six-week supply of TB 
drugs at a time. Despite not following the WHO recommendations, the programmes in 
South Sudan and Somalia achieved a cure rate of at least 85%. However, in 
Nicaragua, the programme achieved much lower cure rate (66% on an average). In 
India, the SAT programme also performed poorly (53%) but DOTS, which was based 
on the WHO recommendations, did slightly better (69%). However, another study 
from India, where the frequency of the directly supervised treatment was reduced to 
three times a week, did achieve a cure rate of 86% (Rodger et al. 2002).  
 
Biot et al. (2003) throw some light into whether “sub-optimal” programmes that do 
not follow the WHO recommendation of six-month treatment with 85% cure rate, 
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should be considered in complex emergencies. Using mathematical models, they 
estimated the benefits and risks of different treatment scenarios and concluded that 
although TB programmes should aim at 85% cure rate, in complex emergencies, 4-
month treatment for 75% of patients is beneficial to a situation of no treatment at all. 
This raises questions on whether the WHO guidelines need to be relaxed for complex 
emergencies and begs further empirical research.  
 
It is possible to argue that the complex emergency framework itself is not practical and a 
better method is needed to identify the variety of crises – as one guideline does not fit 
all. Furthermore, with the different types of crises, guidelines could be more context-
specific. This could imply setting different thresholds for considering cure rates as 
successful (as suggested by Biot et al. (2003)) and prioritising different strategies 
depending on the type and scope of crisis. For example, the programme in South Sudan 
was established during the “acute phase” of a complex emergency, in an unstable and 
hostile environment. It achieved a cure rate of 85% during the crisis. Factors such as 
reducing the daily supervision treatment to four months and providing “runaway bags” 
of medication could be “context-specific” strategies for an acute unstable crisis where an 
NGO (like MSF in this case) is capable to coordinate such an effort without the 
support of the local government. Without the support of an NGO, WHO 
recommendation to postpone TB programmes until stability is restored would be 
advisable. Conversely, programmes in a longer, more established “chronic complex 
emergency”, such as in Cambodia which was also successful in achieving 85% cure rate, 
benefited from making sure TB wards were well integrated with the public hospitals as 
this reduced delays in treatment, and ensured continuous training of staff, regular 
monitoring and food support for patients and relatives. Therefore, settings in which 
there is less disruption in the functioning of the existing public health system, and 
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where NGOs can help fill gaps in coverage, would benefit from strengthening the 
already established national programmes to deliver TB treatment.  
 
Greater collaboration between the local and external stakeholders was another 
important factor for implementing successful TB programmes in complex 
emergencies. Our review found that programmes with strong political support from 
the national government and the community were able to deliver TB programmes 
(Liddle et al. 2013, Rodger et al. 2002, Norval et al. 1998). Many programmes 
obtained political endorsements from local stakeholders - community leaders, army 
commanders and local authorities. Particularly essential in conflict regions where 
suspicion and distrust are high. Many programmes used existing public health 
providers to deliver TB programmes (Norval et al. 1998, Rodger et al. 2002). Where 
government infrastructure was destroyed, programmes were often operated by NGOs 
(e.g. MSF). The role of international donors was also crucial in maintaining a 
continuous supply of drugs and supplies and providing technical assistance, training, 
and monitoring in many countries (Keus et al. 2003, Rodger et al. 2002, Norval et al. 
1998, Tigani et al. 2008). However, the presence of multiple agencies can also lead to 
duplication of efforts and inefficiencies in implementation. Not only must the diverse 
agencies interact with people, roles and areas of expertise that they are unfamiliar 
with, they have to do so under high-risk and high-stress conditions. Start Network 
offers a refreshing solution; it offers a platform for NGOs to make decisions 
collectively and respond quickly to “under the radar” emergencies around the world. 





Adapting to the local socio-political context is important for the success of a 
programme in any setting. However, in complex emergencies, the need to maintain 
neutrality was identified as critical in Kosovo and India. This was particularly 
reflected in the selection of health workers. In Kosovo, healthcare workers were 
carefully selected from those who could safely cooperate with both the dominant and 
minority populations (Tigani et al. 2008) and in India, patients were assigned outreach 
worker from their own ethnic group (Rodger et al. 2002).  
 
Other factors such as trained staff and effective monitoring are not unique to complex 
emergencies but they are certainly more difficult to realise. In all programmes 
achieving a cure rate of 85% or over, training and supervision were essential for 
success. Further, the emphasis was laid on continued training and regular supervision. 
Developing staff not only helped maintain quality but also improved staff motivation, 
team-building and problem-solving skills – qualities needed when working in an 
emotionally and physically challenging situation.  
 
Furthermore, a major theme to be explored in complex emergencies, which has not 
been discussed in our included papers, is a unified system to allow tracking of 
patients. Technological innovations are currently being developed for resource-poor 
settings and if used correctly could be highly effective in complex emergencies. For 
example, mHealth services (healthcare using mobile communication technologies) 
have been found useful in improving adherence to treatment by sending voice-based 
reminders to patients to take their medications on time (Narasimhan et al. 2014). 
Another example is from Operation Asha an NGO, which has developed a system 
known as “eCompliance” to track every dose a patient takes by scanning their 
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fingerprints. Patients’ medical and TB history is also electronically saved, and if doses 
are missed, the system issues an SMS alert to the patient and supervisor. This has 
shown to increase compliance and cure rates (Snidal et al. 2015). These technological 
innovations can help monitor treatment compliance and reduce visits to the health 
facility, which can be immensely beneficial in complex emergency settings.  
 
Finally, our review does not include refugee settings however there are similarities 
and contrasting conclusions. Similar to our findings, close coordination and 
collaboration between the local health agencies and the NTP of the host country was 
found to be essential for a successful TB programme in refugee populations (Bam et 
al. 2007). Although TB prevalence tends to be higher among refugees as compared to 
host country or country of origin (which could be because of better detection of TB in 
refugee camps), treatment outcomes are often better because of shorter distances 
needed to travel and health education campaigns (Bohler et al. 2005, Kimbrough et al. 
2012) – distance and education were identified as important in our review as well. An 
interesting factor that was not found by our review relates to stigma. According to 
Cookson et al. (2015) in the Syrian refugee camps in Jordan, stigma associated with 
TB was higher inside the camp than outside because of the overcrowded living 
conditions, which can reduce diagnosis and compliance to medications.   
 
Limitations of the review and of the literature analysed 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has synthesised information 
on factors that contribute to successful implementation of TB programmes in complex 
emergencies. However, our results should be used with caution. In spite of using a 
broad search strategy, we found only fifteen studies that met our inclusion criteria. 
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These fifteen studies used varied study designs. Since the context was challenging, 
understandably none of the studies adopted a randomised control or case-control 
study design to test different TB programmes. The number of included studies would 
have been even smaller if we used the EPOC methodology, specifically reducing the 
studies on the implementation process. The data collected from the studies ranged 
from 1985 to 2012. In this time period, guidelines for TB treatment have been 
amended and the humanitarian response to emergencies is constantly changing, 
making it hard to compare study outcomes over time. Some studies are not recent and 
do not highlight the current state of complex crises. A recent study on the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa used computational models to estimate TB deaths due to a 
reduction in TB treatment coverage. It estimated that TB deaths increased by 51% in 
Guinea, 59% in Liberia and 62% in Sierra Leone (i.e. 1281, 592 and 841 additional 
deaths respectively) during the crisis (Parpia et al. 2016). This was contrary to what 
Ortuno-Gutierrez et al. (2016) found in ten health facilities in the Conakry region of 
Guinea i.e. TB programmes and services were sustained during the crisis and there 
was no drop in diagnosis and cure rates. But, this study was in collaboration with the 
Damian Foundation which supported and gave additional funds and technical 
assistance to the ten health facilities under study. However, as in these studies, in 
depth understanding of the actual implementation of TB programmes is however 
limited. Studies were also hard to compare in terms of the type and severity of 
complex emergencies. Publication bias can be an issue in any review. By searching 
and including grey literature and programme reports we were able to minimise this to 
some extent. We might have also missed relevant studies written in languages other 
than English.  However, in spite of these limitations, taken together, the studies 
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The aspect which is largely missing from current research is patients’ perspective. We 
lack an understanding of people experience of accessing TB programmes in complex 
emergencies. Further, more robust research is needed to assess the effectiveness of 
sub-optimal programmes that do not follow the WHO guidelines and their implication 
on drug resistance. In addition, further research must be centred on developing a 
better framework to identify the variety of crises; as this will enable the development 
of specific guidelines for the type of crises involved. Finally, it would be beneficial to 
know the long-term implications and effects of the reported projects to be able to 
further advocate for the inclusion of TB treatment in complex emergencies.   
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in spite of the challenges, many TB programmes were successful in 
complex emergencies. We have highlighted some aspects that contributed to this 
success. Further research is needed to understand how people in complex emergencies 
cope with TB and their experience of accessing TB programmes. As more evidence 
becomes available, WHO guidelines on TB programmes may need to be revisited and 
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Records identified through 
database searching 
(n=573) 
Additional records identified 
through other sources 
(n=6) 




Full-text articles excluded, with 
reason (n=31) 
 
 Not a complex emergency or on 
refugee camp (n=7)  
 Not on the implementation of TB 
programmes (n=11) 
 TB as a secondary illness or 
comorbidity (n=5) 
 On MDR-TB (n=3) 
 Not in English (n=2) 





























































































































































































Afghanistan Ango. Cambo. DRC East Timor Haiti India Kosovo Mozambique Nicaragua Somalia SS
WHO target (85%) 












Type of Tuberculosis 
Afghanistan 
2004 87% 
Pulmonary Smear Positive only. Available data from 2000-2003 
show important inconsistencies. Data from 2004 onward are 
considered to be reliable.  
      
2005 90% 
Pulmonary Smear Positive only. Data extracted from Mauch et al 
(2010). 
      
2006 84% Does not specify. 
2007 87%   
2008 88%   
2009 87%   
2010 90%   
2011 91%   
Angola 1998 91% Pulmonary Smear Positive only. 
Cambodia 
1994 85% Pulmonary Smear Positive only. 
1995 92%   
DRC 
2004 84% Pulmonary Smear Positive only 
   
2005 85% 
Pulmonary Smear Positive only. Data extracted from Mauch et al. 
(2010)  
East Timor 
1997 50% Pulmonary Smear Positive only 
2000 65%   
2001 73%   
2002 81%   
2003 81%   
Haiti 2005 81% 
Pulmonary Smear Positive only. Data extracted from Mauch et al. 
(2010)  
India 




Using DOTS. All cases (Pulmonary smear-positive, Pulmonary 




Using SAT All cases (Pulmonary smear-positive, Pulmonary smear 
negative and Extra pulmonary). 
Kosovo 









Pulmonary Smear Positive only using the Short-course Regimen 
(2SHRZ/6HT). 
1986 81%   
1987 74%   
1988 76%   
1989 76%   
Nicaragua 1988 81% 
Pulmonary Smear Positive only in Region I, Region V, and Region 










74% Pulmonary Smear Positive only. 




Pulmonary Smear Positive only. Data extracted from Mauch et al 
(2010) 
      
2005-
2012 
81% Pulmonary Smear Positive only. 
South Sudan 2001 85% Pulmonary Smear Positive only. 
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Liddle et al. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Martins et al. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Das et al. ✓ 
       
Norval et al. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Heldal et al. ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Number of issues 15 8 13 9 5 7 9 7 
Percentage of 
Studies 
100% 53% 87% 60% 33% 47% 60% 47% 
 
 
 
